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DIRECTORATE OF
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19 Feb 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

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~~TOP SECRET~~*Vietnam:

South Vietnam: The new round of coordinated Communist attacks on urban centers and military facilities has thus far lacked the scope and intensity of the Tet offensive.

The majority of the attacks, consisting principally of mortar and rocket fire, were focused on the southern provinces, with only scattered actions reported from the central and northern regions. Less than ten of the more than 40 cities and bases that were hit suffered follow-up ground probes. The heaviest ground assaults appear to be at Vinh Long in the delta and at Phan Thiet on the coast east of Saigon. Casualties on both sides have been considerably lighter than in the first round.

Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base received some 100 rounds of mortar and 122-mm. rocket fire on the 18th, with moderate losses to personnel, aircraft, and facilities; sporadic shelling continued again today. Sharp skirmishing has been reported in outlying areas of the capital. Within the city, the police headquarters and several other key installations have received mortar fire but no ground attacks were mounted.

There are indications [redacted] that additional high-level Communist command elements are now near Saigon or are moving toward it. These developments strongly suggest that the enemy is planning a major step-up in military pressure against the capital.

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There has been no significant outbreak of fighting in I Corps, but sporadic shelling of Khe Sanh continues and there have been small-scale clashes along the coastal area from Da Nang to the Demilitarized Zone. Large enemy forces, meanwhile, remain in position to strike major targets throughout South Vietnam's I Corps and some areas of II Corps with little warning.

In Hue, fighting in the Citadel area continues indecisively. New enemy attacks occurred against the cleared

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area of the city on 18 February. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] efforts are under way to reinforce the Communists presently entrenched in some sections of the city.

A meeting of top members of the Communist military and political hierarchy in South Vietnam was held on 11 and 12 February, according to Communist broadcasts. The meeting probably was convened to review the over-all Communist situation in the wake of the Tet offensive, and to pass on Hanoi's instructions for the coming weeks. A similar meeting was held in mid-January.

Although evidence on future enemy strategy is fragmentary, what is available indicates that continued military pressure will be accompanied by strenuous political agitation and organizational efforts to exploit the situation in both urban and rural areas. (Map)

North Vietnam: Two IL-28 jet light bombers returned to Phuc Yen airfield from Communist China on the night of 18 February. Three IL-28s also flew to Phuc Yen in early February, but were never used in any attack missions. One was damaged by a US air strike and the other two returned to China last week. [REDACTED]

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
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Iraq-USSR: The Soviets are continuing to assist Iraq with chemical warfare training. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] small quantities of toxic agents--including about 20 grams of a nerve gas--recently were brought to Iraq by two Soviet chemical officers. The toxic agents are being used in a training course the Soviets are conducting in Iraq for Iraqi chemical officers. Over the past several years military personnel from Iraq and Egypt have traveled to the USSR for chemical warfare training. [REDACTED]

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